Abstract-This paper focuses on the finding of an optimal pricing and leasing strategy for both the third-party warehouse and customers, whose conflicts lie on their contradictory objective functions, via bilevel optimization approach. Bilevel optimization is a game-based approach where the third-party warehouse is a leader, who first decides the price of short and long-term rental contracts taking the behavioral reaction of other players, that is, customers and its competitor, into consideration. Once observed, customers then decide which contracts to be chosen so that their objectives are optimized. While complicated, under certain assumptions, we can show that closed-form solutions could be derived. Our experimental results indicate that competitor storage price significantly affects both third-party warehouse's profit and all of its customer's total costs. Besides, large customer tends to suffer more from high opportunity cost; but, the delivery cost charged by the third-party warehouse is crucial for small customer's rental decision.
I. INTRODUCTION
Third-party warehouses have played an important business role in the networks of several supply chains as they provide storage buffer against fluctuating demand and supply. Warehousing and storage leasing industry is also one of the fastest growing businesses nowadays. According to the National Bureau of Statistic (NBS) of China, in 2013, the Chinese national warehousing fixed asset was about 69.2 billion dollars, increasing by 32.7% when compared to 2012's figure [1] .
In terms of operations, warehousing companies provide storage services with fixed capacity, measured in pallets, to a wide range of customers; and, storage pricing is crucial for both storage providers and customers as it directly affects their operational costs -and so profitability [2] . In addition, as storage space could be considered a perishable product -it loses value if left unoccupied -and some warehouses are equipped with special equipment, i.e. refrigerated warehouse, utilizing this storage space to its maximum potential is also a typical goal for those warehousing companies [3] . In order to achieve such a goal, effective partnership strategies between warehousing companies and customers are thus required as they could turn opportunity cost into mutual benefit -and be allocated to each player [4] . Long-term storage space leasing schema is one of such strategies, where a warehouse reserves part of its space for long-term leasing, and the rest for contingency use, i.e. short-term leasing. Based on this schema, the warehouse is beneficial from the reduction of potentially idle space, while the customers could enjoy a cheaper unit price from the warehouse [5] . However, as both short and long-term prices, along with the prices set by its competitors, directly affect the decisions made by customers -and so the warehouse'soptimal pricing and leasing strategy is, therefore, needed so that both players could enjoy the surplus gained by a rationale decision making process [6] .
In order to better understand the behavior of both warehousing companies and customers in a dynamic setting, in this paper, a bilevel optimization model is developed and applied on a simple system consisting of two warehousesthe third-party warehouse and its competitor -and | I | customers. For simplicity, we assume that the third-party warehouse knows its customers' demand patterns over the planning horizon; and it is responsible for the delivery to the customers. Additionally, the third-party warehouse offers two types of leasing contracts, that is, short and long-term ones, while the competitor provides only one fixed leasing contract. While the price offered by competitor and that of the warehouse's long-term contract are rather stable, the price of the short-term contract gradually rises based on the usage length. For clarity, Fig. 1 shows the comparison of unit storage prices from all leasing contracts. Based on this setting, our proposed procedure will first let the warehouse decide on storage pricing, and, once observed, customers will then decide on appropriate inventory planning so that the leasing cost is minimized. As we assume that both players are rationale, the warehouse can then iteratively evaluate the best pricing strategy based on its customer's and • j is an index for planning cycles ( 1,..., ) jJ = .
• x is a nonnegative integer decision variable representing number of long-term leasing space by customer i at the warehouse (units).
• ij n is a nonnegative integer decision variable representing number of deliveries from the warehouse to customer i in planning cycle j (deliveries) whose calculation is based on short-term leasing space
• p t X is excess inventory at the warehouse at time t (units).
• c ij D is number of deliveries from the competitor to customer i in planning cycle j (deliveries). It is worth noting that our proposed bilevel optimization model is based on Stackelberg Game with two main sets of players, that is, warehouses and its customers [7] . For simplicity, there are only two warehouses and | I | customers, each of which has | J | planning cycles whose lengths are not necessarily equal -but with the same planning horizon. All inventory will be stored at the warehouse at the beginning of each planning cycle and gradually withdrawn during such a cycle. And, the process repeats through the end of planning horizon. As customers may lease both short and long-term space in one particular time period, for economical reason, we assume that inventory will be first drawn from the short-term rental space and then the long-term one [8] .
Based on the literature [9] , solving a bilevel optimization problem is quite difficult as there is no efficient algorithm to solve large-scale problems to optimality. Therefore, the following assumptions are imposed for tractability.
(1) The unit of storage space for both warehouses are the same.
(2) The capacity of the third-party warehouse is limited. 
   =+
, where  is an average demand and  is a standard deviation. (1, 2,3,..., ) ij cn = , total inventory stored at the warehouse by customer i in planning cycle j could be calculated by (1) . 
An Optimization Model for the Third-Party Warehouse
The objective of the third-party warehouse is to determine the optimal storage pricing strategy that maximizes its total profit, subject to two practical constraints that limit the prices of both short and long-term rental contracts, as follows.
Subject to: 0
The warehouse's objective (2), is simply a finding of prices for both short and long-term contracts ( s p and l p ) that maximize its total profit, where (3) -(6) denote the revenues from short-term storage, long-term storage, delivery, and customer's opportunity cost; lastly, (7) and (8) denotes inventory holding and penalty costs at the warehouse, respectively.
• Short-term leasing cost (3) is calculated by the summation of total inventory multiplied by the short-term rental cost, which is an increasing function of storage time ( s pt where 0 tT  ).
• Customer's opportunity cost (6) is calculated from vacant space rented by the customers from all possible scenarios, i.e. when there is no demand.
• Inventory holding cost (7) is calculated from both short and long-term rental contracts based on total inventory (1). Lastly, inequalities (9) and (10) help limit the ranges of s p and l p that should not exceed the price set by its competitor.
B. An Optimization Model for the Customers As the objective of customers is to minimize their total costs, once the prices of all rental contracts are observed, each customer then decides on the amount of short and long-term leasing space. Minimize ( , )
Subject to:
The objective of customer i (11) is simply total cost minimization, where the cost function consists of short-term storage cost, long-term storage cost, and delivery cost at the warehouse -Equations (3) - (5), respectively. Equation (12) shows the opportunity cost from leasing idle space, which is similar to (6) but with different parameters. Similar to (3), Equation (13) denotes the cost of leasing space from competitor but with constant price. Equation (14) denotes delivery cost from competitor and Inequalities (15) -(17) limit the ranges of l i x and ij n .
III. SOLUTION PROCEDURE
Below is the pseudo code of our proposed methodology for solving storage pricing and leasing problems based on bilevel optimization. 
To check whether the critical points from () 
Based on the determinants of all leading principal minors, (25) and (26), it could be seen that ( , ) 
Since ls p kp = , warehouse pricing function (29) defines both short and long-term rental contracts for the warehouse; while (27) and (28) are closed-form solutions for customer reaction.
IV. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
For simplicity, we test our proposed model on a simple system consisting of two warehouses -the third-party and its competitor -and two different customers, one being a big customer (C1) having more average demand and variation, and another is a comparably small one (C2) with less demand and variation. The model is executed over 360 days, with 3 seasons and 12 planning cycles. The input parameters are drawn from previous research [8] .
• T = 360 days • The initial inventory is set to zero Based on this setting, the optimal pricing and leasing decisions of the warehouse and all customers, along with the sensitivity analysis on some key parameters, are shown in Table I . This solution does make a good sense when the opportunity cost of customers is low, as both C1 and C2 will react to the warehouse decision by leasing a lot of long-term space due to such a high price of s p . 
B. Customer's Opportunity Cost ( c OC )
As we increase customer's opportunity cost ( c OC ), the warehouse's profit is observed to rise and then decline as shown in Fig. 5 . Intuitively, by increasing customer's opportunity cost, customers should have leased less long-term space and relied more on short-term contracts resulting in higher operational cost.
However, we observe that ZC1 decreases when we increase c OC , which seems particularly strange in practice. But, this could be explained by the reaction of the third-party warehouse as it would increase the value of s p to compensate revenue loss. However, if such a cost is too high, the customers will lean toward a cheaper alternative offered by the competitor resulting in a lower cost at customer and a lower profit at the third-party warehouse. 
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we develop a game-based bilevel optimization model for the determination of optimal pricing and leasing strategy for both the third-part warehouse and its customers. A numerical study is also conducted on a small-scale problem with two customers, along with the sensitivity analysis on some important parameters. Our numerical results indicate that the competitor's storage price has remarkable impact on both the warehouse's profit and customers' total cost. Moreover, the warehouse's delivery charge has more impact on small customer -as it could attract more long-term space demands by reducing delivery cost; but, this is not the case for a large customer, with more demand and high variation, as it tends to focus more on opportunity cost.
While we can improve pricing and leasing strategy by the proposed schema, some limitations are worth to be mentioned. Firstly, we assume that long-term price is a function of short-term price, where ls p kp = . This however does not hold true in general as the long-term prices depend on several factors, such as seasonality and the amount of space to be leased. Accordingly, it would be interesting to see the changes as this assumption has been relaxed and replaced by some more realistic functions. Secondly, we assume that all customers are the same in terms of bargaining power as we apply the same leasing price to all customers. But, in practice, large customers should be differently treated; and, this would affect both decisions made by the warehouse and other players. Finally, dynamic pricing strategy on different customers with different characteristics should be further studied.
